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Abstract
We consider a leader who can choose between a transactional or a transformational
style of leadership to motivate a team of followers, in presence of moral hazard and free rid-
ing. Transformational leadership extends transactional leadership by allowing the leader
to deliver a motivational message in addition to standard monetary incentives. When
followers adhere to the leader's message, they get more motivated and exert more eﬀort.
We show that there is a complementary between monetary incentives and the motivational
message. Furthermore followers are better oﬀ under transformational leadership. We also
show that when the team size increases, transformational leadership - even if it comes
at a ﬁxed implementation cost - becomes less and less proﬁtable for the leader compared
to transactional leadership, at least when the size increase does not reinforce too much
the social incentives to adhere to the leader's vision. When the size increase makes so-
cial incentives suﬃciently stronger, transformational leadership regains interest and can
even remedy the free-riding and moral hazard problems. Our results are in line with the
empirical literature on leadership.
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"The modern business of management is often managing the 'insides' - the hopes,
fears, and aspirations - of workers, rather than their behaviors directly" (Deetz,
1995).
1 Introduction
Every year, the newly hired employees of Gentle Giant, a Massachusetts moving company,
participate in a stadium run during which they have to run up and down the 37 sections
of Harvard stadium, encouraged by other employees. This hard physical challenge is followed
by a breakfast and an orientation speech from the CEO of the company, Peter O'Toole. By
organizing this event, the company delivers the message that eﬀort, sense of challenge, solidarity
and teamwork should be essential parts of employee values at work.
Since the 1980s, leadership and management ideas have incorporated soft aspects both at
practical and theoretical levels. With the advent of organizational culture, employee develop-
ment, employee empowerment and team building, leadership has been willing to alter the
way employees perceive, understand and value the tasks they perform, how they feel related to
their workgroup, and how they identify with the organization and its objectives. In the termi-
nology of Bass (1985, 1990), leadership has switched from a transactional conception, in which
employees exert eﬀort in exchange of a monetary reward, to a transformational conception, in
which in addition to money, leaders articulate a vision through a motivational message in order
to raise employees' aspirations and make them exert eﬀort beyond what is typically expected
in a transactional context. Transformational leadership notably often emphasizes the leader's
vision as a basis for group identity: Followers adhere to the message because they value joining
a shared experience and derive meaning from being linked to a collective (Shamir, House and
Arthur, 1993 ; Ashforth and Mael, 1989). In other words, there are social incentives to endorse
the leader's vision.
In this article, we propose a formal framework to analyze the transactional and transfor-
mational styles of leadership through the lenses of incentive theory. What vision should the
transformational leader articulate to obtain follower adherence? How to combine monetary
incentives, social incentives, and the motivational message to better motivate employees? Does
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the transformational style allow to remedy problems like moral hazard or free riding that are
typical of the transactional style? Does the transformational style beneﬁt followers?
The literature on leadership has identiﬁed several types of messages available to a trans-
formational leader to raise employees' aspirations (Bass, 1985 and 1990). First the leader can
provide more meaning and purpose to employees by explaining how their individual work con-
tributes to the functioning of the overall organization. Employees are more motivated when
they know how they ﬁt into the big organizational picture. To enrich the task meaning, the
leader can notably communicate a joint purpose to followers by stating `who we are', `what we
do and why' and `what we value'. Second, the leader can give more autonomy to employees,
foster their initiative, and encourage them to tackle old problems in new ways. Third, the
leader can act as a role model for the employees by maintaining high standards of conducts
and backing up talk with action. Fourth, the leader can provide more attention to employees,
listen to their needs and concerns, and express gratitude when work is done.1
From a behavioral point of view, transformational leadership acts on followers' identity.
Generally speaking, an individual's identity answers the questions of who, what, where, and
why the individual is.2 Through the motivational message, the transformational leader cre-
ates a narrative that helps followers to position more clearly their identity with respect to the
tasks they perform, the team they belong to, and the entire organization. Work becomes more
meaningful for followers and their intrinsic motivation to exert eﬀort increases.3 A consequence
is that transformational leadership is typically associated with higher levels of employees' ef-
fort, well-being and job satisfaction (e.g., Arnold, Barling, Kelloway, McKee, 2007). Clearly,
followers are not passive consumers of managerially designed identities: they are more will-
ing to adhere to the leader's motivational message if it is compatible with their initial values
regarding work. Furthermore, followers are more inclined to adhere when they perceive that
the message is addressed to a group of people, also inclined to accept. Indeed, followers may
value being part of a new stimulating shared experience and derive more meaning from being
1Transformational leadership is close to the concept of Identity regulation, a mode of control that is
accomplished through the self-positioning of employees within managerially inspired discourses about work
and organization with which they become more or less identiﬁed and committed (Alvesson and Willmott,
2002:620).
2One can also talk of self-concept.
3See Cassar and Meier (2018) for a survey about meaning as a source of intrinsic motivation for employees.
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linked to a group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).4 Furthermore, a larger number of adopters may
reduce the uncertainty inherent to adherence (e.g., Hogg and Mullin, 1999). Finally, a larger
group may accentuate the conformity eﬀects or the peer pressure eﬀects acting on followers.5
Transformational leadership is not equally eﬀective in all contexts:
• It is more eﬀective in small or medium ﬁrms than in more complex organizations (Ling,
Simsek, Lubatkin, and Veiga, 2008).
• It is more eﬀective in teams higher in power distance (acceptance of hierarchy) and
collectivism (strength of the ties that people have to others within their community)
(Robbins and Judge, 2013).
• It is more eﬀective when the motivational message is used in conjunction with high mon-
etary incentives (Kvaløy, Nieken, and Schöttner, 2015 ; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).
In this paper we modelize the leader-follower(s) relationship using a principal-agent(s) frame-
work. The leader can choose either a transactional or a transformational style of leadership
to motivate a team of followers. Under transformational leadership, the leader seeks to alter
the followers' values and attitudes regarding work by delivering a motivational message, which
entails a certain cost to implement. The ﬁrst contribution of this article is to oﬀer a conceptual
framework to understand how the followers' decisions to adhere to the leader's vision and their
eﬀort levels are aﬀected by the interplay between monetary incentives and the two types of
non-monetary incentives associated with transformational leadership, namely the motivational
message and the social incentives. Are the incentives substitutes or complements? Do followers
beneﬁt when the leader implements a transformational style of leadership? The second con-
tribution consists of characterizing the parameters that determine the leader's choice between
the transactional and transformational styles. Notably, what is the role played by the size of
the team? Third, the relationship between the leader and the followers under transactional
leadership is subject to typical agency problems like limited liability, moral hazard and free
4Psychologists talk of group identity to refer to a person's sense of belonging to a group.
5As in the Gentle Giant example of the stadium run, the leader can reinforce the social incentives to adhere
by making clear that the motivational message is addressed to a large group of employees. He or she can also
engage in the rhetorical use of we and us to foster the group identity (Steﬀens and Haslam, 2013). We will
come back to this point later.
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riding, that reduce the ability of the leader to align the followers' actions on his or her own
objectives and reach ﬁrst-best eﬃciency. Is transformational leadership, by allowing the leader
to deliver a motivational message, able to remedy agency problems and get closer to ﬁrst-best
eﬃciency? Fourth, followers may have diﬀerent initial levels of intrinsic motivation. For the
leader, the question becomes to know which follower(s) to target with the motivational message.
Should the leader deliver an ambitious vision only aimed at followers with the highest initial
intrinsic motivation? Should the leader deliver a less ambitious vision to which more followers
will adhere?
To address these questions we construct a model where the principal (the leader) employs
a team of agents (followers) to work on a joint project. The leader cannot observe the ef-
fort levels exerted by followers. Each follower is characterized by an initial level of intrinsic
motivation. The leader can either use a transactional or a transformational style of leader-
ship. Transactional leadership is used as a benchmark case and relies on standard monetary
incentives. Transformational leadership goes beyond transactional leadership by adding the
possibility for the leader to deliver a motivational message to followers, at a given ﬁxed cost, F .
Each follower can adhere or not to the message. There is a psychological cost to adhere that is
increasing in the diﬀerence between the initial intrinsic motivation of the follower and the eﬀort
level associated with the message. However, there is also a beneﬁt to adhere because embracing
the leader's vision provides meaning to the follower and induces a higher intrinsic motivation.
The follower adheres to the message when the beneﬁt outweighs the cost of adherence. In this
case, he or she becomes more motivated and exerts more eﬀort. We obtain three main results
that are consistent with the stylized facts about transformational leadership.
The ﬁrst result states that under transformational leadership, the motivational message and
monetary incentives are complements: a follower adheres to a motivational message distant
from his or her initial intrinsic motivation when monetary incentives are suﬃciently high.
Furthermore, for a given level of monetary incentives, the highest motivational message that
followers are ready to accept also depends on the size of the team. We consider two cases.
In the ﬁrst case, the social incentives to adhere are not or little aﬀected when the team gets
larger. In this situation, when the team size increases, the leader has to deliver a motivational
message more congruent with followers' initial intrinsic motivation (that is, a less ambitious
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vision) to obtain their adherence. This result is due to a transformational free-riding eﬀect :
A follower is less willing to incur the cost of adherence if he or she knows that other followers
will adhere to the message and exert more eﬀort. The transformational free-riding eﬀect diﬀers
from the standard (transactional) free-riding eﬀect due to team production, but is also stronger
when the number of followers increases. The second case corresponds to the situation where
social incentives to adhere increase strongly when the team gets larger. In this case the extra
social incentives outweigh the stronger transformational free-riding eﬀect and followers accept
to endorse a motivational message that is more distant from their initial intrinsic motivation.
Second, we compare the followers' utility and the ﬁrm's proﬁt under the two styles of
leadership. We show that followers are better oﬀ under transformational leadership because
of the higher levels of monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation. Regarding proﬁts, we
characterize the range of values of the cost F such that the leader prefers transformational
leadership over transactional leadership. We show that the area associated to transformational
leadership is larger when followers' initial level of intrinsic motivation is low: the motivational
message helps mobilize less engaged workers. When the team size increases but social incentives
to adhere are not or little aﬀected, we show that implementing transformational leadership
becomes progressively less proﬁtable for the leader than transformational leadership. This result
may come as a paradox given the ﬁxed nature of the cost F incurred by the leader to implement
transformational leadership. In fact it is a consequence of the transformational free-riding eﬀect.
When social incentives to adhere increase suﬃciently as the team gets larger, transformational
leadership becomes at ﬁrst more attractive than transactional leadership when the number of
team members grows. The reason is that the stronger social incentives make adherence to
the leader's message easier, which outweighs the transformational free-riding eﬀect. However
beyond a certain team size, transformational leadership may again become less interesting than
transactional leadership for the leader if social incentives reach an upper bound. Nevertheless,
when social incentives keep growing suﬃciently strongly with the team size, we show that
transformational leadership is able to remedy the free-riding eﬀect, and can even allow to reach
the ﬁrst-best optimum associated with the transactional framework. In this polar case, social
incentives to adhere to the leader's vision have to be so strong that we refer to this type of
transformational leadership as charismatic.
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Third, we consider the case of a team of two followers with diﬀerent initial levels of intrinsic
motivation. The question becomes now for the leader to know which employee(s) to target and
convince through the motivational message. We show that the leader's message targets the two
employees when their initial levels of intrinsic motivation are not too diﬀerent.
There is a burgeoning theoretical literature in economics that studies how an organization
can alter the preferences of its employees through its leadership or management style. Rotem-
berg and Saloner (1993) show that, when contracts are incomplete, the empathy of the leader
toward followers can improve their incentives to engage in innovative activities and can increase
proﬁts in contexts where innovation opportunities are numerous. Akerlof and Kranton (2008)
study the problem of a ﬁrm that faces a moral hazard problem regarding workers' eﬀort. The
ﬁrm can either decide to monitor workers closely or more loosely. Monitoring workers closely
allows to detect shirking more easily, but reduces their intrinsic motivation to work because
identiﬁcation with the organization becomes more diﬃcult. Akerlof and Kranton characterize
the circumstances under which the ﬁrm prefers less supervision. Kvaløy and Schöttner (2015)
consider a motivator who can exert a costly motivational eﬀort to reduce the eﬀort costs of a
worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational eﬀort and monetary incentives.
They show that money and motivation can be substitutes or complements. Furthermore, the
motivational eﬀort may exceed the eﬃcient level. Donze and Gunnes (2018) develop an agency
model in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal of eﬀort. The ﬁrm does
not observe the personal ideals but can make employees more sensitive to the social ideal by
fostering social interaction in the workplace. They show that the ﬁrm invests in social bonding
to reinforce the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives and to reduce the adverse selection prob-
lem, by making employees more similar. Another part of the literature on leadership sees the
leader as the agent who possesses a superior information compared to the others. In this vein,
Hermalin (1998) considers a team leader who has some private information about the value of
a joint project and can exert an observable eﬀort before the other team members. Hermalin
shows that the leader leads by example: eﬀort acts as a signal that reveals the value of private
information. Van den Steen (2005) shows that a leader with a vision, deﬁned as strong beliefs
about the right course of action, attracts employees with similar beliefs, through sorting in the
labor market. It may be optimal for a ﬁrm to hire such a leader, notably when uncertainty is
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high and actions are diﬃcult to contract on.
Our work diﬀers from previous works in two aspects. First we do not only consider the case
of a single follower but also the case of a team of followers. This allows us to highlight the
impact of the team size and the strength of social incentives on the choice of the leadership
style. When social incentives are little aﬀected by the size, transformational leadership becomes
less proﬁtable than transactional leadership as the team size increases. When social incentives
are strongly and positively aﬀected by the team size, transformational leadership becomes
more and more proﬁtable compared to transactional leadership and can even solve agency
problems. Our framework therefore explains why transformational leadership emphasizes the
importance for the leader of a large team to construct a group-oriented vision to which their
followers can identify: creating a group identity and strong social incentives to endorse the
leader's vision is a necessary condition to make transformational leadership successful. Second,
we allow each follower not to endorse the leader's vision if this vision is too far from the
follower's initial intrinsic motivation. In our context, followers are not passive consumers of
organizational identities, but have to be convinced by both the message, the monetary incentives
and the social incentives to adhere to the vision. This leads us to highlight the concept of
transformational free-riding. The interplay between the transformational free-riding eﬀect and
the social incentives constitutes a key determinant of the leader's choice of leadership style.
The article is organized as follows: In section 2, we modelize the transactional and the
transformational styles of leadership. In section 3, we solve the model and determine the
optimal style of leadership when followers are identical. In section 4, we consider the case of
two heterogeneous followers. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We follow the literature on leadership and refer to the principal as the leader and the
agents/employees as the followers.
The framework. A risk neutral leader ("she") employs a team of n risk neutral followers
(each of them referred to as "he") to work on a common project. Follower i exerts an eﬀort
level ei ∈ [0, 1]. The leader cannot observe the eﬀort levels, which induces a moral hazard
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problem. The project is successful with probability e¯ ≡
∑n
j=1 ej
n
, in which case it yields the
payoﬀ Y (n). We will mainly deal with the case of constant returns to scale: Y (n) = ny (for
a given y > 0), but will also evoke the case of increasing and decreasing returns to scale in
subsection 3.5. The project fails with probability 1− e¯, in which case it yields the payoﬀ 0. At
the beginning of the game, the leader can choose between two styles of leadership: transactional
or transformational. We assume that the leader faces important transaction costs and thereby
proposes the same compensation scheme to all followers.6
Transactional leadership. It is denoted by subscript a. Under transactional leadership, the
leader proposes the compensation contract (sa, ba) to each of the n followers, where sa is the
base salary, and ba is the bonus paid when the project is successful. We assume that followers
have no initial wealth and cannot borrow on the imperfect ﬁnancial market. The consequence is
that the leader is subject to a limited liability constraint, sa ≥ 0 and ba ≥ 0. If follower i refuses
the contract, he gets his reservation utility, which we assume equal to zero. In this case, we set
ei = 0. If follower i accepts the contract, he exerts eﬀort along with the other followers, and
the production and the payments are realized, conditional upon the project outcome (success
or failure). Follower i's (expected) utility is deﬁned as
Ui,a = e¯
(
sa + ba − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2
)
+ (1− e¯)
(
sa − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2
)
= sa + e¯ba − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2 (1)
where c > 0. We assume that utility is separable in revenue and cost. The shape of the cost
function 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2 conveys the idea that follower i has an initial level of intrinsic motivation,
eˆi, which corresponds to the eﬀort that i exerts when the bonus is nil, but the base salary is
suﬃciently high to ensure that the participation constraint is satisﬁed.7 The higher (resp. the
lower) the initial personal intrinsic motivation, the lower (resp. the higher) the marginal cost
6This assumption does not change anything when followers are identical (section 3) but makes a diﬀerence
when followers are heterogeneous (section 4). See Benabou and Tirole (2016) or Donze and Gunnes (2018) for
the case where a ﬁrm uses a menu of contracts to screen employees according to their initial intrinsic motivation.
7Holmström and Milgrom (1991) consider the same kind of cost function to modelize intrinsic motivation.
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of eﬀort. Formally, we have
∂
∂( 12 c(ei−eˆi)2)
∂ei
∂eˆi
= −c < 0 (2)
The leader's (expected) proﬁt is
pia = e¯ (ny − nba − nsa) + (1− e¯) (−nsa)
= e¯ (ny − nba)− nsa (3)
Transformational leadership. It is denoted by subscript f . Under transformational lead-
ership, the leader oﬀers a compensation contract (sf , bf ) and articulates a vision vf ≥ ê. Her
objective is to alter the initial intrinsic motivation of followers. We assume that the leader's
vision is expressed in units of eﬀort. If follower i refuses the contract, he gets his reservation
utility, which we assume equal to zero. In this case, we set ei = 0. If follower i accepts the
contract, he can adhere to the leader's vision or not. The leader does not observe whether
follower i has adhered or not. The (expected) utility of follower i reads
Ui,f =
sf + e¯bf −
1
2
c (ei − êi)2 if i does not adhere to vf
sf + e¯bf − 12c (ei − vf )2 − µ (m) (vf − êi)2 if i adheres to vf
(4)
where m denotes the total number of followers who are expected to adhere, with m ≤ n.
When follower i adheres to the motivational message, his intrinsic motivation rises from the
initial level eˆi to the level associated with the message, vf . This corresponds to the idea that
transformational leadership allows to increase the intrinsic motivation of followers by making
their work more meaningful. Adherence comes at a psychological cost µ (m) (vf − êi)2. To
interpret this cost, consider ﬁrst the case of a given value of m. The adherence cost is larger
when the message vf is more distant from the initial intrinsic motivation eˆi: It is more diﬃcult
for a follower to endorse a leader's vision that is not congruent with his initial work values. The
value of µ (m) reﬂects how follower i is sensitive to the distance between the message and his
initial intrinsic motivation: a smaller µ (m) means a smaller sensitivity to distance. We assume
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that the sensitivity is the same for all followers. The value of µ (m) can be interpreted in several
ways: It reﬂects the persuasiveness of the leader: a more charismatic leader is associated with a
smaller µ (m). It also depends upon followers' acceptance of hierarchy and instructions: When
acceptance is high, µ (m) is lower and followers are more prone to adhere to the leader's vision.
Finally it reﬂects the intensity of social incentives to adhere. Social incentives are deﬁned as the
beneﬁts or the costs of participating (or not) to some activity that arise from relationships with
other people of a group as the pleasure of doing things together, the emotional gratiﬁcation of
belonging to the group, or conformity eﬀects. In our context, in accordance with the literature
on transformational leadership (e.g. Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993; Ashforth and Mael,
1989, or Bass and Avolio, 1994), followers may value joining the new shared experience deﬁned
by the leader's vision and derive identity and meaning from being linked to a collective. More
prosaically, they may also be subject to conformity or peer pressure eﬀects. Stronger social
incentives mean a smaller value of µ(m).
Consider now that m increases. We will study two cases. The case where µ (.) is a constant
function means that social incentives to adhere to the leader's vision do not increase with the
(expected) number of adopters. The case where µ (.) is a decreasing function means that the
intensity of social incentives grows with the team size: each follower is more willing to adhere
when he perceives that the message is addressed to a large group of followers, also inclined to
accept. As noted before, being part of a larger group of followers who embrace the leader's
vision may provide more meaning to each follower, reduce the uncertainty associated with
adherence, and/or accentuate the conformity or peer pressure eﬀects.8
The leader's (expected) proﬁt is
pif = e¯ (ny − nbf )− nsf − F, (5)
where F is the cost of implementing transformational leadership. We assume that this cost
is ﬁxed and does not depend upon the number of followers to convince. We will see that
even if this assumption is favorable to transformational leadership when the team is large, it
is still the case that transformational leadership becomes less and less proﬁtable compared to
8One can also think that faced with a larger team, the leader will also articulate a more inclusive vision in
order to create a group identity. We will develop this idea more thoroughly in subsection 3.5.
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transactional leadership when the number of followers increases, at least when social incentives
do not increase too much with the team size. We will discuss later what happens when this
assumption of a ﬁxed cost is relaxed.
3 The case of identical followers
In this section, we consider the case where followers are identical: eˆi = eˆ for any i. We make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (a) 0 < y
c
≤ 1 ; (b) 0 ≤ eˆ ≤ min
{
y
c
, 1− y
4c
−
√
y2
16c2
+ y
2c
}
; (c) For any
n ≥ 1, µ(n) ≥ c
n(2−eˆ) c
y
−1 .
Conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Assumption 1 guarantee that we will obtain interior solutions
and well-deﬁned probabilities. (a) and (b) notably guarantee that y
c
+ eˆ ≤ 1.9 Condition
(b) is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. We solve the equilibria corresponding to the transactional and
transformational styles of leadership.
Figure 1
3.1 The transactional leadership equilibrium
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium.
9Indeed assumption 1 implies that yc + eˆ ≤ yc +1− y4c −
√
y2
16c2 +
y
2c = 1+
3y
4c −
√
y2
16c2 +
y
2c . However
y
c ≤ 1
guarantees that 3y4c −
√
y2
16c2 +
y
2c ≤ 0.
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The follower's problem. Consider follower i and the compensation scheme (sa, ba) with
sa + ba ≤ y. Follower i′s optimal eﬀort level is
e∗i,a = arg max
ei
Ui,a =
ba
nc
+ eˆ (6)
Expression (6) shows that a higher bonus or a higher initial intrinsic motivation induce follower
i to exert more eﬀort. Not surprisingly, the team structure and moral hazard induce free riding:
for a given contract (sa, ba), the larger the team, the lower the individual eﬀort. This is due
to what Prendergast (1999) calls the 1/n problem: When follower i increases eﬀort by dei
units, he gets an extra (expected) beneﬁt of dei
n
× ba, which is smaller for a larger team. We
will refer to this type of free-riding as transactional free-riding because it is due to the fact that
monetary incentives are less and less eﬃcient as the number of followers increases. Note that
follower i exerts the level of eﬀort eˆ when ba = 0. At the optimum, the utility level of follower
i is sa + baeˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b2a
n2c
and the average eﬀort - with its two drivers - reads
e∗a =
ba
nc︸︷︷︸ + eˆ︸︷︷︸
monetary initial intrinsec
incentives motivation
(7)
The leader's problem. She maximizes the proﬁt under constraints :
max
ba≥0,sa≥0
e∗a (ny − nba)− nsa (8)
st. sa + baeˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b2a
n2c
≥ 0
where e∗a is deﬁned by expression (7). The constraints ba ≥ 0, sa ≥ 0 correspond to limited
liability. The remaining constraint corresponds to the participation constraint. The base salary
does not play any incentive role but represents a cost for the leader who therefore chooses s∗a = 0.
The optimal bonus is
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b∗a =

y
2
− nceˆ
2
if n ≤ y
ceˆ
0 if n > y
ceˆ
(9)
When eˆ = 0, the bonus is equal to y
2
: when the project is successful, each follower gets a bonus
equal to one half of the per-capita return of the project.10 When eˆ > 0, the leader sets a bonus
smaller than y
2
because followers are already intrinsically motivated and willing to exert eﬀort.
When the team gets larger, the bonus decreases and becomes nil beyond the team size y
ceˆ
. The
reason is that as the team size increases, the 1/n problem (expression (7)) makes monetary
incentives less and less eﬃcient compared to the intrinsic motive to exert eﬀort, whose intensity
remains equal to eˆ. Dropping the subscript i, the optimal eﬀort level of a follower is
e∗a =

y
2nc
+ eˆ
2
if n ≤ y
ceˆ
eˆ if n > y
ceˆ
(10)
Under transactional leadership, at equilibrium, followers exert more eﬀort when their initial
intrinsic motivation is higher or when the per capital return of the project under success is
larger. As the team size increases, the eﬀort levels decrease and tend to the level associated
with the initial intrinsic motivation, eˆ.11 The optimal proﬁt reads
pi∗a =

1
4c
(
y + nceˆ
)2
if n ≤ y
ceˆ
neˆy if n > y
ceˆ
(11)
3.2 The transformational leadership equilibrium
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction. Consider a motiva-
tional message vf ≥ ê and a compensation scheme (sf , bf ) with sf + bf ≤ y.
The follower's problem. We derive the conditions under which the situation where the n
followers accept the compensation contract (sf , bf ) and adhere to the leader's message vf is a
10When eˆ = 0, yceˆ =∞ and we always stay in the case n ≤ yceˆ .
11Note that assumption 1 guarantees that the eﬀort levels are smaller than one (because y2nc +
eˆ
2 ≤ y2c + eˆ2 ≤
1
2 < 1), which is a necessary condition to deﬁne the probability of success.
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Nash equilibrium. Consider follower i. His equilibrium eﬀort when he adheres to vf is
e∗i,f = arg max
ei
Ui,f =
bf
nc
+ vf . (12)
and the associated payoﬀ is
sf +
2n− 1
2n2c
b2f + bfvf − µ(n)(vf − eˆ)2 (13)
If follower i deviates unilaterally from the equilibrium and does not adhere to the vision vf ,
the payoﬀ he gets when exerting an eﬀort edf becomes
sf +
(
(n− 1)( bf
nc
+ vf ) + e
d
f
)
bf
n
− 1
2
c(edf − eˆ)2 (14)
Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to edf yields the optimal eﬀort associated with the deviation:
edf =
bf
nc
+ eˆ. Therefore, the highest payoﬀ reachable by the deviating follower reads
sf +
2n− 1
2n2c
b2f +
n− 1
n
bfvf +
bf
n
eˆ (15)
To have an equilibrium, follower i should not beneﬁt from deviating unilaterally: expression
(15) must be smaller than expression (13), which gives vf ≤ eˆ + bfnµ(n) . Therefore, a follower
adheres to the leader's vision if and only if vf ∈
[
eˆ, eˆ+
bf
nµ(n)
]
.
The leader's problem. For a given bf , the leader chooses the highest possible message
compatible with followers' initial intrinsic motivation:
v∗f = eˆ+
1
nµ(n)
bf (16)
The expression of v∗f has several interesting properties. Consider ﬁrst the case of a given team
size, n. The leader has to propose a positive bonus bf if she wants to make followers accept
a message above their initial intrinsic motivation, eˆ. In this case, the diﬀerence between v∗f
and eˆ is higher when the monetary incentives bf are higher or when the cost of adherence
µ(n) is smaller. This means that there is complementary between monetary incentives and the
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motivational message, a non-monetary incentive.
Second, let us assume that the team grows in size. This has two eﬀects in expression (16)
that will interact: a transformational free-riding eﬀect corresponding to the term 1
n
, and an
eﬀect on the intensity of social incentives corresponding to the term 1
µ(n)
. To make this point
clear, consider ﬁrst the case where µ(n) = µ, which corresponds to the situation where social
incentives to adhere do not increase when the team gets larger. For a given level of monetary
incentives, the leader has to propose a less ambitious vision v∗f if she wants to make followers
adhere. This is due to a transformational free-riding eﬀect: if follower i expects that a larger
number of followers will accept the message and thereafter exert a higher eﬀort, i is himself
less willing to accept the cost of adherence. Consider the case where µ(n) is decreasing in
n. As noted before, this may be due to the fact that social incentives to adhere get stronger
when the team size increases. For example, each follower may be more willing to embrace
the leader's vision if he anticipates that a large number of other followers will also adhere
because adherence oﬀers an immediate sense of transcendence, or more prosaically, because
conformity or peer pressure eﬀects are stronger. When n gets larger, the increase in social
incentives partly or completely oﬀsets the stronger transformational free-riding eﬀect. Let us
deﬁne εµ(n) = −nµ′(n)µ(n) (> 0), a measure of how social incentives to adhere increase with the
team size. When 0 < εµ(n) < 1, the term nµ(n) of expression (16) is increasing in n: As
the team gets larger, the increase in social incentives is not suﬃciently strong to compensate
for the stronger transformational free-riding eﬀect and the leader has to choose a vision more
congruent with the initial intrinsic motivation of followers. When εµ(n) ≥ 1, function nµ(n) is
decreasing in n: social incentives oﬀsets the transformational free-riding eﬀect and the leader
can propose a more ambitious vision.
At equilibrium, each follower exerts an eﬀort level equal to
bf
nc
+ v∗f =
µ(n)+c
µ(n)c
× bf
n
+ eˆ. The
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average eﬀort - and its three drivers - reads
e∗f =
bf
nc︸︷︷︸ + eˆ︸︷︷︸ + bfnµ(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary initial intrinsec motivational
incentives motivation message (and
social incentives)
(17)
and the utility level of a follower is sf + bf eˆ +
(
n− 1
2
) b2f
n2c
+ n−1
n2
b2f
µ(n)
. Comparing expressions
(7) and (17) shows that the motivational message induces followers to exert eﬀort beyond the
transactional level: for a given b > 0, e∗f − e∗a = bnµ(n) > 0. Furthermore, monetary incentives
are more eﬃcient under transformational leadership than under transactional leadership:
∂e∗f
∂bf
=
1
nc
+ 1
nµ(n)
> ∂e
∗
a
∂ba
= 1
nc
. We sum up these ﬁrst results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a transformational style of leadership. (a) For a given team size,
the stronger the monetary incentives bf , the more followers are willing to accept a leader's
vision distant from their initial intrinsic motivation:
∂(v∗f−eˆ)
∂bf
= 1
nµ(n)
> 0. (b) Suppose the team
size increases. This has an impact on social incentives to adhere to the leader's vision. When
this impact is limited (in the sense that εµ(n) < 1), the complementary between the monetary
incentives and the motivational message is weakened:
∂2(v∗f−eˆ)
∂bf∂n
= εµ(n)−1
n2µ(n)
< 0. When the impact
is important (in the sense that εµ(n) ≥ 1), the complementary between the monetary incentives
and the message is reinforced:
∂2(v∗f−eˆ)
∂bf∂n
= εµ(n)−1
n2µ(n)
≥ 0.
We can now consider the maximization problem of the leader:
max
bf≥0,sf≥0
e∗f (ny − nbf )− nsf − F (18)
st. sf + bf eˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b2f
n2c
+ n−1
n2
b2f
µ(n)
≥ 0
where e∗f is deﬁned by expression (17).The optimal bonus is
b∗f =

y
2
−
(
µ(n)
µ(n)+c
)
nceˆ
2
if n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
0 if n > µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
(19)
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Comparing expressions (19) and (9) shows that b∗f = b
∗
a when eˆ = 0 and b
∗
f ≥ b∗a when eˆ > 0.
When followers are initially intrinsically motivated, transformational leadership improves the
eﬃciency of monetary incentives relatively to the intrinsic motive to exert eﬀort and therefore
the ﬁrm chooses a higher bonus than in the transactional case. The optimal message is
v∗f =

y
2nµ(n)
+
(
2µ(n)+c
µ(n)+c
)
eˆ
2
if n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
eˆ if n > µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
(20)
and the optimal eﬀort level is
e∗f =

(
µ(n)+c
µ(n)
)
y
2nc
+ eˆ
2
if n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
eˆ if n > µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
(21)
Comparing expressions (21) and (10) shows that e∗f ≥ e∗a.12 Followers exert a higher eﬀort
under transformational leadership because they are better paid and have a higher intrinsic
motivation because the task is more meaningful. For a given team size n, the lower the cost
µ(n) of adhering to the leader's vision, the larger the diﬀerence e∗f − e∗a. The optimal proﬁt is
pi∗f =

1
4
µ(n)+c
cµ(n)
(
y + cµ(n)
µ(n)+c
neˆ
)2
− F if n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
neˆy − F if n > µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
(22)
In the next paragraph we compare the surpluses of followers and the proﬁts under the two
styles of leadership.
3.3 Transactional leadership or transformational leadership?
Before studying the leader's optimal choice of leadership style by comparing the proﬁts pi∗a and
pi∗f , we can give a ﬁrst result on consumer welfare.
Proposition 2. When n < µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
, followers are better oﬀ under the transformational style
of leadership than under the transactional style. When n ≥ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
, followers are equally
12Note that assumption 1 guarantees that e∗f ≤ 1. Indeed
(
µ(n)+c
µ(n)
)
y
2nc +
eˆ
2 ≤ 1 is equivalent to µ(n) ≥
c
n(2−eˆ) cy−1 .
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oﬀ.
Proof. Under transactional leadership, the equilibrium utility of each follower is equal to
b∗aeˆ+
(
n− 1
2
)
b∗2a
n2c
. Under transformational leadership, the equilibrium utility of each follower is
equal to b∗f eˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b∗2f
n2c
+ n−1
n2
b∗2f
µ(n)
. When n < µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
, expressions (9) and (19) show that
b∗f > b
∗
a ≥ 0 and therefore b∗f eˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b∗2f
n2c
+ n−1
n2
b∗2f
µ(n)
> b∗aeˆ+
(
n− 1
2
) b∗2a
n2c
. When n ≥ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
,
we have b∗f = b
∗
a = 0, followers obtain a nil utility under both styles of leadership. 
The result in proposition 2 comes from the fact that the bonus under transformational
leadership is higher than under transactional leadership: b∗f ≥ b∗a. Furthermore under transfor-
mational leadership, followers can accept the contract with the higher bonus b∗f and still escape
from the cost of adherence µ(n)(v
∗
f − eˆ)2 by deviating and choosing not to endorse the leader's
message.13 The higher bonus and the possibility to deviate guarantee followers a higher surplus
than under transactional leadership.
We now determine whether the leader chooses a transactional style or a transformational
style of leadership. Let F˜ (n) denote the particular value of F that makes the leader equally
oﬀ between transactional leadership and transformational leadership: pi∗a = pi
∗
f . The higher the
value of F˜ (n), the larger the range of F under which transformational leadership is chosen by
the leader. We ﬁnd
F˜ (n) =

y2
4µ(n)
− n2c2eˆ2
4(µ(n)+c)
if n < y
ceˆ
1
4
µ(n)+c
cµ(n)
(
y − cµ(n)
µ(n)+c
neˆ
)2
if y
ceˆ
≤ n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
0 if n > µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
(23)
Proposition 3. Consider a team of size n. If F < F˜ (n), the leader implements a transforma-
tional style of leadership. If F ≥ F˜ (n) the leader implements a transactional style of leadership.
For n ≤ µ(n)+c
µ(n)
× y
ceˆ
, F˜ (n) is increasing in the output per capita, y; decreasing in the initial
level of intrinsic motivation, ê; and decreasing in the sensitivity to distance, µ(n).
Therefore, for a given team size n, transformational leadership becomes less attractive for
13Of course, followers do not not deviate at equilibrium, but the possibility to deviate constitutes a sort of
outside option for them.
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the leader when the cost to endorse the leader's vision is higher. We have noted that the
value of µ (n) notably reﬂects the strength of the ties that followers have to others within the
team. It could explain the stylized fact that transformational leadership is more eﬀective in
contexts higher in collectivism. Transformational leadership becomes more attractive when
the per-capita output under success, y, is higher. This comes from the fact that a higher y
allows a higher bonus, b∗f , and therefore a higher motivational message, v
∗
f , by complementarity
between the monetary incentives and the non-monetary incentives. Transformational leadership
becomes less attractive for the leader when followers are already initially intrinsically motivated,
that is when ê is larger. This may also explain the development of soft management since the
1980s in response to a pervasive perception of declining workplace ethics (Benabou and Tirole,
2016): Providing meaning to employees and managing their insides could have been used as
a substitute for reduced levels of intrinsic motivation. Casey (1996) notes for example that
the devices of workplace family and team manifest a corporate eﬀort to provide emotional
gratiﬁcations at work to counter the attractions of rampant individualism.14
Suppose now that the team size increases. To study the shape of F˜ (n), it is convenient to
make a distinction between the case where the intensity of social incentives to adhere to the
leader's vision is not aﬀected by the team size and the case where the intensity is aﬀected.
No eﬀect of team size on the intensity of social incentives. We have µ(n) = µ. Consider
the case where eˆ = 0, which means that the worker has no initial intrinsic motivation for work.
In this case we have F˜ (n) = F˜ ≡ y2
4µ
for any n ≥ 1. We have the paradoxical result that
even if the cost to implement transformational leadership is independent of the number of
followers, transformational leadership does not become more attractive when the number of
followers increases: when eˆ = 0 and µ(n) = µ, F˜ (n) is constant in n. The reason is the
following. Under constant return to scale (where total production Y is equal to ny), the proﬁt
under transactional leadership when followers are not initially intrinsically motivated becomes
pia =
(
ba
c
)
(y − ba): because of the 1/n problem associated with the transactional free-riding
problem, a transactional leader working with a team of n > 1 followers engenders the same
14The fact that F˜ (n) is decreasing in eˆ may also explain that transformational leadership is notably well suited
to situations in which the organization faces uncertainty and change (Bass, 1985 & 1990), as these situations
are typically associated with reduced levels of intrinsic motivation among followers.
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proﬁt that a transactional leader working with a single follower. What is interesting is that the
same result holds for a transformational leader: the proﬁt reads pif =
(
1 + c
µ
)(
bf
c
)
(y − bf ),
and does not depend upon n. As noted before, there are two 1/n problems aﬀecting eﬀort
under transformational leadership (see expression 17): one on monetary incentives, like for
the transactional style, and another one on the motivational message itself, because of the
transformational free-riding eﬀect. When eˆ = 0 and µ(n) = µ, the two 1/n problems explain
that a transformational leader with a team of n > 1 followers engenders the same proﬁt that
a transformational leader with a single follower. F˜ (n) is illustrated in ﬁgure 2(a) for y = 5,
c = 10, µ = 5 and eˆ = 0.
Figure 2
Consider the case where eˆ > 0. When n increases, F˜ (n) decreases, meaning that transfor-
mational leadership becomes less proﬁtable as the number of followers increases, despite the
ﬁxed cost of implementing transformational leadership. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2(b) for
y = 5, c = 10, µ = 5 and eˆ = 0.2. The reason is the following. When the team size increases
but the intensity of social incentives stays constant (µ(n) constant), the transformational free-
riding eﬀect forces the leader to propose a less ambitious vision to followers and consequently,
the motivational speech and the monetary incentives do not allow to diﬀerentiate as much the
transformational style from the transactional style: F˜ (n) has to decrease. We show in the
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following point that this result does not hold anymore when the team size aﬀects the intensity
of social incentives.
Positive eﬀect of team size on the intensity of social incentives. Let us now assume
that µ(n) is decreasing in n. When eˆ = 0 , F˜ (n) = y
2
4µ(n)
becomes increasing in n. A larger
team means higher social incentives and a lower psychological cost for followers of endorsing the
leader's vision. This makes transformational leadership increasingly proﬁtable for the leader.
The case is illustrated in ﬁgure 3(a) for y = 5, c = 10, µ(n) = 5
2
(1 + 1
n
) and eˆ = 0 and in ﬁgure
4(a) for y = 5, c = 10, µ(n) = 5
n
and eˆ = 0.
Figure 3.
When eˆ > 0, there are several possible shapes of F˜ (n) when n increases. The reason is
that under transformational leadership, the stronger social incentives to adhere to the leader's
vision come to thwart the transformational free-riding eﬀect. When social incentives increase
only slightly with the team size, F˜ (n) decreases in n as in the previous paragraph. When
social incentives increase moderately with the team size and then reach a ceiling, F˜ (n) ﬁrst
increases with n but then decreases. The case is illustrated in ﬁgure 3(b) for y = 5, c = 10,
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µ(n) = 5
2
(1+ 1
n
) and eˆ = 0.2.15 When social incentives increase and do not reach a ceiling, F˜ (n)
increases with n. The case is illustrated in ﬁgure 4(b) for y = 5, c = 10, µ = 5
n
and eˆ = 0.2.
Figure 4
We now study in more details the case where social incentives strongly increase with the team
size.
3.4 Can transformational leadership solve the transactional free-riding
problem and the moral hazard problem?
Transformational leader and free riding. The transactional free-riding eﬀect can be seen
in the expression of the optimal eﬀort under transactional leadership, e∗a =
ba
nc
+ eˆ. We have
de∗a
db
= 1
nc
: the eﬃciency of monetary incentives diminishes as the team size grows. Does
transformational leadership allow to restore the eﬃciency of monetary incentives and remedy
to the transactional 1/n problem by inducing the eﬀort level e∗f =
bf
c
+ eˆ? The answer is yes
provided that social incentives grow suﬃciently with the team size. Under transformational
leadership, eﬀort is e∗f =
bf
nc
+ vf and the maximum message compatible with followers' initial
15Note that µ(n) → 52 when n → ∞, which can be interpreted by saying that social incentives do not go
beyond a certain level.
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intrinsic motivation is vf = eˆ+
bf
nµ(n)
. Consider the case where the value of µ(n) is equal to c
n−1 .
In this case, the optimal eﬀort under transformational leadership becomes equal to e∗f =
bf
c
+ eˆ:
followers react to monetary incentives irrespective to their number, as if there were only one
follower: the transactional and the transformational 1/n problems disappear.16 The optimal
monetary incentives become b∗f =
y−ceˆ
2
and the proﬁt reads
pi∗f =
n
4c
(y + ceˆ)2 − F
We have the following:
Proposition 4. When social incentives grow suﬃciently fast with the team size in the sense
that µ(n) ≤ c
n−1 , transformational leadership solves the free-riding problem at a cost equal to
F for the leader.
Transformational leadership and the moral hazard problem. While µ(n) = c
n−1 allows
to solve the free-riding problem, the moral hazard problem remains and the leader cannot reach
the ﬁrst-best proﬁt associated with the transactional model, considered as a benchmark. To
verify this claim, consider the transactional case and suppose that there is no moral hazard:
the leader can observe the eﬀort level exerted by each follower. In this case the leader can reach
the ﬁrst-best proﬁt. To do so, she proposes a contract (so, eo) to followers specifying that each
follower receives the ﬁxed payment so when the eﬀort level eo is exerted and zero otherwise.
The contract (so, eo) yields the reservation utility to each follower: so − 12c(eo − eˆ)2 = 0, which
implies that eo =
√
2so
c
+ eˆ. The leader maximizes the proﬁt
(√
2so
c
+ eˆ
)
ny − nso in so. The
solution is s∗o =
y2
2c
, e∗o =
y
c
+ eˆ and the proﬁt reads
pi∗o = (
y
c
+ eˆ)ny − ny
2
2c
=
ny2
2c
+ eˆny
One can easily verify that ny
2
2c
+ eˆny ≥ n
4c
(y + ceˆ)2 which means that when µ(n) = c
n−1 the
increase in social incentives, while solving the free-riding problem, is not suﬃcient to solve the
16For µ(n) = cn−1 , we have εµ(n) =
2n
2n−1 = 1 +
1
2n−1 > 1. Social incentives have to solve both the free-
riding eﬀect on the motivational message and the free-riding eﬀect on the monetary incentives. Note also that
µ(n) = cn−1 satisﬁes assumption 1(c) as
c
n−1 ≥ cn(2−eˆ) cy−1 . Indeed n − 1 <
3
2n − 1 < n(2 − eˆ) cy − 1 because
c
y ≥ 1 by assumption 1(a) and eˆ is necessarily smaller than 12 by assumption 1(b).
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moral hazard problem. We study the shape of µ(n) that allows to remedy to moral hazard.
A necessary condition to solve moral hazard is pi∗f ≥ pi∗o which can be rewritten as
1
4
µ(n) + c
cµ(n)
(
y +
cµ(n)
µ(n) + c
neˆ
)2
≥ ny
2
2c
+ eˆny (24)
When eˆ = 0, expression (24) is equivalent to µ(n) ≤ c
2n−1 .
17 Therefore a necessary condition for
the proﬁt under transformational leadership to be at least as large as the ﬁrst-best proﬁt under
transactional leadership is that the sensitivity µ(n) is bounded above by the decreasing function
of n, c
2n−1 . In fact, transformational leadership remedies moral hazard when µ(n) ≤ c2n−1
and F ≤
(
µ(n)+c
4µ(n)
− n
2
)
y2
c
. Suppose now that eˆ > 0. Expression (24) can be rewritten as
µ(n)
c
≤ µ˜(n)
c
≡
(
1−n−n ceˆ
y
+n
√
2 ceˆ
y
+1
)
2n−1+2n ceˆ
y
−n2 c2eˆ2
y2
.18 We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. When the conformity eﬀect is suﬃciently strong in the sense that µ(n)
c
≤ µ˜(n)
c
,
transformational leadership allows to reach the ﬁrst best associated with the benchmark case
and to solve the moral hazard problem at a cost equal to F for the leader.
The threshold µ˜(n)
c
is represented on ﬁgure 5 as a function of n for diﬀerent values of ceˆ
y
. It
is decreasing in n because social incentives have to be stronger as the team size increases. For
a given n, it is also decreasing in ceˆ
y
: When followers have a higher initial intrinsic motivation,
the advantage of transformational leadership over transactional leadership shrinks. To recover
the advantage, it is necessary to have higher social incentives.
17Assumption 1(c) is satisﬁed because when eˆ = 0, we have 2n− 1 ≤ n(2− eˆ) cy − 1 since cy ≥ 1.
18Assumption 1(b) guarantees that
c
(
1−n−n ceˆy +n
√
2 ceˆy +1
)
2n−1+2n ceˆy −n2 c
2eˆ2
y2
≥ cn(2−eˆ) cy−1 so that e
∗
f ≤ 1.
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Figure 5
3.5 Discussion and extensions
Charismatic leadership. Our framework allows to give a precise deﬁnition of the conditions
under which transformational leadership becomes charismatic. We have already noted that
transformational leaders can increase the intrinsic motivation of followers by diﬀerent means
like (i) making the task(s) more meaningful, (ii) providing more autonomy to followers, (iii)
acting as a role model, (iv) being sensitive to followers' needs or (v) creating a group identity.
Charismatic leadership may be seen as a type of transformational leadership that strongly
emphasizes point (v): A charismatic leader is usually deﬁned as a transformational leader with a
high persuasive power and the ability to shape through a narrative a collective ambition to which
the followers can relate. Followers adhere to the leader's vision because participation oﬀers a
sense of transcendence, what Durkheim refers to as a collective eﬀervescence (Durkheim,
1965). The feeling of belonging to a group is an important source of pride and self-esteem. The
charismatic leader articulates a group-oriented vision that serves as a schema of interpretation
through which followers can link their self-concept with a broader entity such as a team, a
workgroup or the entire organization. He or she acts as an identity entrepreneur by crafting
a sense of us (Haslam et al. 2011). To do so, the charismatic leader highlights the role of
followers as key elements of the functioning and the performance of the organization and engages
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in the rhetorical use of we and us.19 Evidence shows that inclusive messages help people
to mobilize. For example, Steﬀens and Haslam (2013) analyze the Australian federal election
speeches of successful and unsuccessful Prime Ministerial candidates of the last 43 elections
since 1901 and measure the use of personal (`I', `me') and collective pronouns (`we', `us') by
candidates. They show that victors used more collective pronouns than their unsuccessful
opponents in 80% of all elections. On average, victors used collective pronouns every 79 words
versus every 136 words for losers.
In our model a natural deﬁnition of a charismatic leader is someone who, when the team
size gets larger, is able to remedy the transactional free riding problem by nurturing social
incentives. In other words the charismatic leader is able to make monetary incentives (at least)
equally eﬃcient, regardless of the team size, which corresponds to the case where µ(n) ≤ c
n−1 .
To give an example of a simple function µ(n) satisfying the previous inequality, consider the
case where µ(n) = c
θγ(n−1) . Parameter θ ∈
[
0,
√
3
2
]
can be interpreted as the leader's charisma.
Parameter γ ∈
[
0,
√
3
2
]
is a catch-all parameter that represents employees' orientation toward
the collective, propensity to conform or acceptance of hierarchy.20 When θγ ≤ 1, leadership
cannot be charismatic and cannot solve the transactional free-riding because the leader's ability
to inspire is too weak or employees' individualism is too pronounced. When θγ ≥ 1, The leader's
charisma is suﬃciently developed and followers are suﬃciently oriented toward the collective
to make leadership charismatic.
Leadership styles, returns to scale and the cost of transformational leadership. Up
to now, we have dealt with the case of constant return to scale (Y (n) = ny) to establish
proposition 1. How is the leader's choice of leadership style aﬀected when returns to scale are
increasing or decreasing? Consider the function Y (n) = ny(n) with y(1) = y. Returns are
increasing when y(n) is increasing in n, constant when y(n) = y, and decreasing when y(n) is
decreasing in n. Taking y(1) = y allows to compare the three diﬀerent regimes of returns to
scale because for n = 1, the leader will choose the same style of leadership under all regimes.
It is easy to show that compared to constant returns to scale, increasing returns will make the
19The transformational leader often serves as a role model for followers (leading by example) because the
motivational message is more easily accepted if the leader is perceived as prototypical of the group (van Knip-
penberg and Hogg, 2003)
20Assumption 1(c) is satisﬁed because θγ(n− 1) ≤ 32 (n− 1) < 32n− 1 ≤ (2− eˆ) cyn− 1. See footnote 16.
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area where transformational leadership is chosen larger. The reason is that F (n) is increasing
in y (and therefore also in y(n)) as we saw before by studying expression (23). On the contrary
decreasing returns to scale will make the area where transformational leadership is chosen
smaller. This result suggests that environments with increasing returns are more favorable
for transformational leadership: The existence of productive complementarities between team
members, by increasing the production per capita with the team size, makes the motivational
message more proﬁtable.
It is also interesting to study what happens for a diﬀerent cost of implementing transforma-
tional leadership. So far we have dealt with the case of a ﬁxed cost, F . A natural generalization
is to consider a cost of the shape F + dn with d > 0. In this case F˜ (n) becomes a decreasing
function of n when social incentives to adhere do not increase with the team size. It is for
example the case for the values we have considered in ﬁgure 2(a): y = 5, c = 10, µ = 5 and
eˆ = 0. When social incentives are suﬃciently increasing in n and d is not too large, F˜ (n) is
increasing. Here social incentives have to compensate for the two free-riding eﬀects as in section
3.4 and also for the variable cost of implementing transformational leadership.
Individual-oriented or group-oriented transformational leadership. So far, we have
assumed that the leader chooses one dimension of the vision she proposes to followers, namely
its intensity, ν, expressed in units of eﬀort. In other words, the model is agnostic about the
precise instrument used by the leader to implement transformational leadership. However, we
have noted in section 3 that faced with a larger team, the leader will also articulate a more
inclusive message in order to create a group identity: there is a shift from an individual-focused
vision to a group-focused vision. A recent literature makes a distinction between individual- and
group-focused transformational leaderships (e.g. Wang and Howell, 2010). Individual-focused
transformational leadership corresponds to the situation where leaders display individualized
consideration and socio-emotional support to each follower. They provide followers with discre-
tion to act independently and challenge the status quo. The motivational message highlights
the development of the individual. Group-focused transformational leadership corresponds to
the situation where leaders communicate a shared vision, highlighting the common values and
goals of the group, and its uniqueness. This reinforces the group identity of followers, that is,
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their sense of belonging to a particular group. Leaders can also act as role model, a prototypical
example of the desired behavior. The motivational message highlights the development of the
group.
To modelize the individual or group orientation of the leader's vision, we assume that
under transformational leadership, the leader now chooses a vision composed of two dimensions,
(ν, α): when α = 1, the vision is completely individual focused; when α = 0, the vision is
completely group focused; cases where α ∈ (0, 1) describe intermediary situations. The choice
of α alters µ(n), the function that measures followers' sensitivity to the distance between
the message intensity, ν, and the initial intrinsic motivation, ê. A natural shape of µ(n) is
µ(n) = αµi + (1 − α)µg(n) where µi is a positive constant reﬂecting followers' sensitivity to
distance when the leader chooses an individual-focused vision and µg(n) is a function reﬂecting
followers' sensitivity to distance when the leader chooses a group-focused vision. We assume
that µg(n) is decreasing in n to reﬂect the fact that a larger team may induce stronger conformity
eﬀects and also foster the development of a group identity.21 Furthermore we assume that (i)
µi < µg(1) and (ii) there exists a n˜ > 1 (possibly real) such that µi = µg(n˜). Point (i) means
that faced with a single follower, it is more eﬃcient for the leader to implement an individual-
focused vision. However point (ii) means that above n˜ followers, a group-focused vision becomes
preferable. Consider ﬁrst the case where the cost of implementing transformational leadership
is equal to F . Maximizing the leader's program in α gives
α∗(n) =
 1 if n ≤ n˜0 if n > n˜ (25)
The leader chooses an individual-focused transformational leadership in small teams and a
group-focused transformational leadership in larger teams. Consider then the following more
general cost function of implementing transformational leadership: αD(n) + (1 − α)F where
(i) D(n) is increasing in n, (ii) D(1) < F , and (iii) there exists a n̂ > 1 possibly real such that
D(n̂)− F = 0. Here, the cost of implementing individual-focused transformational leadership,
D(n), has basically a variable nature (and is smaller than F for small teams) while the cost of
21Clearly, µi and µg(n) could also depend on the leader's charisma, θ, and µg(n) could depend on employees'
orientation toward the collective, γ, as in the previous paragraph.
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implementing group-focused transformational leadership, F , has a ﬁxed nature (and is smaller
than D(n) for large teams). The shape of the cost comes to reinforce the previous eﬀect
coming from the shape of µ(n) and gives an advantage to individual focused leadership for
smaller teams and group focused leadership for larger groups. The shape of α∗(n) is therefore
similar to expression (25), with possibly the property of being continuous in n.
4 The case of heterogeneous followers
We now consider the case of two followers denoted 1 and 2 with diﬀerent initial levels of intrinsic
motivation. The value of a successful project is Y = 2y for a given y > 0. Under transactional
leadership, follower i's utility reads
ui,a = e¯
(
ba + sa − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2
)
+ (1− e¯)
(
sa − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2
)
= e¯ba + sa − 1
2
c (ei − eˆi)2
Assumption 2. We have (a) eˆ1 = 0, eˆ2 = eˆ ∈ (0, yc ], yc + eˆ ≤ 1 ; (b) µ ≥ c3 .
Assumption 2 plays an equivalent role to assumption 1. It is required to obtain interior
solutions. For simplicity, we assume that follower 1's initial intrinsic motivation is nil while
follower 2's initial intrinsic motivation is positive and equal to eˆ.
Let (sa, ba) denote the compensation contract proposed by the leader under transactional lead-
ership. Follower i exerts eﬀort ei =
ba
2c
+ eˆi and the average eﬀort is e =
ba
2c
+ eˆ
2
. The leader
maximizes the ﬁrm's proﬁt e(2y − 2ba) − 2sa. The solution is b∗a = y−cˆe2 and s∗a = 0 and the
proﬁt is pi∗a =
1
4c
(y + ceˆ)2.
Let (sf , bf ) denote the contract proposed by the leader under transformational leadership.
The leader can now deliver three diﬀerent types of motivational message: a message aimed at
follower 1, a message aimed at follower 2, or a message aimed at both followers at the same
time.
Case 1. Speciﬁc targeting: Message vf aimed at follower 2. For the given bonus
bf , follower 1 exerts eﬀort e1 =
bf
2c
, follower 2 exerts eﬀort e2 =
bf
2c
+ vf and the average
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eﬀort is e =
bf
2c
+
vf
2
. The expected utility of follower 2 is sf + (
3b2f
8c
+
vf bf
2
) − µ(vf − eˆ)2.
If follower 2 deviates and does not adhere to the leader's vision vf , the best he can do is
to exert eﬀort e2 =
bf
2c
+ eˆ and obtain the payoﬀ sf +
3b2f
8c
+
eˆbf
2
. Follower 2 accepts the
message if sf + (
3b2f
8c
+
vf bf
2
) − µ(vf − eˆ)2 ≥ sf + 3b
2
f
8c
+
eˆbf
2
or vf ≤ eˆ + bf2µ . The highest
message accepted by follower 2 is v∗f = eˆ +
bf
2µ
. Note that follower 1 is too far away from v∗f
to adhere. The eﬀort exerted by follower 1 is e1 =
bf
2c
and the eﬀort exerted by follower 2 is
e2 =
bf
2c
+ eˆ+
bf
2µ
. The average eﬀort is therefore e =
bf
2c
+ eˆ
2
+
bf
4µ
. The leader maximizes proﬁt
e(2y − 2bf ) − 2sf − F. The optimal solution is s∗f = 0 and b∗f = y2 − µc2µ+c eˆ.22 The associated
proﬁt is pi∗f =
2µ+c
8µc
(y + 2µc
2µ+c
eˆ)2 − F .
Case 2. Speciﬁc targeting: Message vf aimed at follower 1. We must necessarily have
vf ≤ eˆ, because otherwise follower 2 would also endorse the message. We show in the appendix
that the highest message accepted by follower 1 is vf = min
(
eˆ,
bf
2µ
)
and the average eﬀort is
e =
bf
2c
+ eˆ
2
+ 1
2
min
(
eˆ,
bf
2µ
)
. We retrieve a situation that is close to the one where the message
was aimed at follower 2, but with a smaller average eﬀort because of the extra constraint vf ≤ eˆ.
From the leader's perspective, this situation is therefore dominated by the speciﬁc targeting
strategy associated with case 1.
Case 3. Broad targeting: Message vf aimed at followers 1 and 2. For the given bonus
bf , we have e1 = e2 =
bf
2c
+vf which is also the average eﬀort. The expected utility of follower 1
is sf +(
3b2f
8c
+bfvf )−µv2f and the expected utility of follower 2 is sf +(
3b2f
8c
+bfvf )−µ(vf− eˆ)2. If
follower 1 deviates and does not adhere to the leader's vision vf , the best he can do is to exert
eﬀort e1 =
bf
2c
and obtain the payoﬀ sf +
3b2f
8c
+
bfvf
2
.23 A necessary condition for not deviating is
vf ≤ bf2µ . Applying the same reasoning for follower 2 gives the condition eˆ ≤ vf ≤ eˆ +
bf
2µ
. The
two previous inequalities are compatible when bf ≥ 2µeˆ and the highest compatible message is
vf =
bf
2µ
. In this case the eﬀort exerted by both followers is
bf
2c
+
bf
2µ
, which is also the average
eﬀort, e. The leader maximizes e(2y− 2bf )− 2sf −F. For the moment we ignore the constraint
bf ≥ 2µeˆ and will verify that the solution we obtain is indeed the right one. The (unconstrained)
solution is s∗f = 0 and b
∗
f =
y
2
. The associated proﬁt is pi∗f =
µ+c
µc
y2
4
−F . Satisfying the condition
bf ≥ 2µeˆ requires that eˆy ≤ 14µ .
22Assumption 2 guarantees that b∗f ≥ 0, e∗1 ≤ 1, e∗2 ≤ 1, and e∗ ≤ 1
23The average eﬀort is
bf
2c +
vf
2 .
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Let us now compare cases 1 and 3. The leader is better oﬀ by targeting both followers when
µ+c
µc
y2
4
≥ 2µ+c
8µc
(y+ 2µc
2µ+c
eˆ)2 which is equivalent to ceˆ
y
≤ 2µ+c
2µ
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
=
2µ
c
+1
2µ
c
(√
2µ
c
+2
2µ
c
+1
− 1
)
.
She targets follower 2 when ceˆ
y
> 2µ+c
2µ
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
. One can verify that for any µ > 0 and
c > 0 we have 2µ+c
2µc
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
< 1
4µ
,24 which means that focusing on the unconstrained
solution in case 3 was the right choice. The areas where each type of targeting is chosen are
represented in ﬁgure 5.
Figure 5
Proposition 6 summarizes the ﬁndings.
Proposition 6. Under transformational leadership, the leader's message targets both types
of followers when they are not too diﬀerent (i.e. when ceˆ
y
is not too large) and when the cost
of adhering is not too high (i.e., when µ
c
is not too large). Otherwise the message targets only
one type of follower.
In our framework with two diﬀerent followers, using a motivational message that targets the
two types of followers allows to raise the intrinsic motivation of the entire workforce. However
24For any µ > 0 and c > 0, inequality 2µ+c2µc
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c − 1
)
< 14µ is equivalent to inequality
√
1 + c2µ+c <
1 + 12
c
2µ+c which is always true.
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the leader has to propose a less ambitious vision because she needs to convince the follower
with the smaller intrinsic motivation to adhere. The task becomes even harder for the leader
when the two followers are very diﬀerent (that is, when ceˆ
y
is high) or when the psychological
cost of adhering is high (that is, when µ
c
is high). We now study the leader's choice between
the transactional and transformational styles of leadership. Transformational leadership is
preferred over transactional leadership when
F < F˜ ≡
(1− 2µ
eˆ
y
− µ ceˆ2
y2
) y
2
4µ
if eˆ ≤ 2µ+c
2µ
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
y
c
1
4
(
y2
2µ
− c2eˆ2
2µ+c
)
if eˆ > 2µ+c
2µ
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
y
c
F is larger when eˆ is smaller, µ is smaller, or y is larger. We retrieve a result analogous to
the one of proposition 3 saying that transformational leadership is more adapted to contexts
where the initial intrinsic motivation of employees is not too high, the value of the project is
large and the cost of adherence is not too high. The threshold F˜ is illustrated in ﬁgure 6 as a
function of eˆ for y = 5, c = 10, µ = 5. Note that 2µ+c
2µ
(√
2µ+2c
2µ+c
− 1
)
y
c
' 0.225.
Figure 6
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a leader who chooses between a transactional or a transfor-
mational style of leadership to motivate a team of followers in the presence of moral hazard and
free-riding. The transactional style is based on monetary incentives, while the transformational
style is based on monetary incentives and two types of non-monetary incentives: a motivational
message and social incentives (such as group identity eﬀects or conformity eﬀects). Our frame-
work gives an active role to followers under transformational leadership because they are free to
adhere or not to the motivational message, which means that the transformational leader has
to choose the appropriate message to convince them. We show that there is a complementary
between monetary incentives and the motivational message: the leader has to set a suﬃciently
high level of monetary incentives to convince followers to endorse an ambitious vision. Further-
more, transformational leadership is subject to a new type of free riding - the transformational
free-riding eﬀect - that diﬀers from the traditional transactional free-riding eﬀect. In fact,
because of moral hazard, each follower is less willing to endorse the leader's vision and incur
the associated psychological cost if he or she knows that the other followers will endorse the
vision and exert more eﬀort. There is a tension between the transformational free-riding eﬀect,
that hinders endorsement, and the social incentives that foster endorsement. When the team
gets larger, the social incentives - if they grow suﬃciently strongly - override the two types
of free riding and transformational leadership remedies the transactional free-riding and moral
hazard problems. Our work therefore highlights the important role played by the social incen-
tives to endorse the leader's vision and the role of the transformational leader as an identity
entrepreneur, at least for large teams of followers. In this context, transformational leadership
is based on the ability of the leader to craft a sense of us through the motivational message
(Haslam et al., 2011). As the team gets larger, the leader has to shift from an individual-focus
vision to a group-focus vision.
Our results are in line and explain the empirical literature on transformational leadership.
First, consistently with empirical evidence, we explain that to be eﬀective, transformational
leadership must associate an ambitious vision and high monetary incentives. Second transfor-
mational leadership is less eﬀective in environments where the ties that people have to others
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within their community are weaker. Third, transformational leadership is less eﬀective in larger
organizations, except if the leader is charismatic and succeeds in creating a group identity
to make followers endorse his or her vision. Fourth, followers are better oﬀ under transforma-
tional leadership because they beneﬁt from higher monetary incentives and from higher levels
of intrinsic motivation, as work is more meaningful.
Appendix
We consider the case of a message vf aimed at follower 1. It must be the case that vf ≤ ê. For
the given bonus bf , follower 1 exerts eﬀort e1 =
bf
2c
+ vf , follower 2 exerts eﬀort e2 =
bf
2c
+ eˆ and
the average eﬀort is e =
bf
2c
+
vf+eˆ
2
. The expected utility of follower 1 is sf +(
3b2f
8c
+
(vf+eˆ)bf
2
)−µv2f .
If follower 1 deviates and does not adhere to the leader's vision vf , he exerts eﬀort e1 =
bf
2
and
obtains the payoﬀ sf +
3b2f
8c
+
eˆbf
2
. Follower 1 accepts the message if sf + (
3b2f
8c
+
(vf+eˆ)bf
2
)−µv2f ≥
sf +
3b2f
8c
+
eˆbf
2
or vf ≤ bf2µ . The highest message accepted by follower 1 is vf = min
(
eˆ,
bf
2µ
)
.
The eﬀort exerted by follower 1 is e1 =
bf
2c
+min
(
eˆ,
bf
2µ
)
and the eﬀort exerted by follower 2 is
e2 =
bf
2c
+ eˆ. The average eﬀort is therefore e =
bf
2c
+ eˆ
2
+ 1
2
min
(
eˆ,
bf
2µ
)
. The leader maximizes
proﬁt e(2y − 2bf )− 2sf − F but cannot reach a higher a higher proﬁt than in case 1.
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